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The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: An Alternative
Perspective on SEC Intervention
in Corporate Governance
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)1 was passed
amidst public uproar over corporate bribes and illegal payments. 2 In
addition to prohibiting certain corporate payments,3 the FCPA added
new accounting provisions4 to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act).5 New section 13(b)(2)(A) (record-keeping amendment)
of the Exchange Act requires corporations to keep accurate books and
I. Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1,
78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. II 1978)).
2. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (United Brands payments to
Honduran officials); Egan, Global Payoff Survey, Wash. Post, June 22, 1975, § F, at 1,
col. 1; Oversight on the Lockheed Loan Guarantee: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (testimony on Lockheed
foreign payments).
3. The FCPA prohibits payments or offers of payments to foreign officials, candidates,
or political parties to influence their official actions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff
(Supp. 11 1978). For a more detailed discussion of the foreign bribery provisions, see At-
keson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An International Application of SEC's
Corporate Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAW. 703 (1978).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. II 1978). Congress incorporated the accounting standards
into the FCPA in order to reinforce its criminalization of corporate foreign bribery. S.
REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4098, 4104-05 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPoRT with page citations to U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws]. Investigations into illegal domestic political contributions by the Office of
the Watergate Special Prosecutor, subsequent investigations by the SEC into questionable
domestic and foreign payments, and the SEC's program of voluntary disclosure of ques-
tionable payments, see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND
ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print May 12, 1976) (submitted to
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.) (sum-
marizing corporate filings under program) [hereinafter cited as MAY 12 REPORT], revealed
that such payments had been facilitated and concealed by falsifying records and main-
taining off-the-books slush funds. Id. at 3. See Rankin, Accounting Ruses Used in Disguis-
ing Dubious Payments, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 1. See generally Herlihy
& Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Payment Problem, 8 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
547, 547-68 (1976) (describing incidence of foreign bribes and methods used to facilitate
such payments).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. II 1978) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
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records. 6 New section 13(b)(2)(B) (internal controls amendment) re-
quires issuers to maintain a system of internal accounting controls to
provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed in ac-
cordance with management authorization and are properly reflected on
the corporation's books and records.
7
These accounting provisions were codified as separate amendments
to the Exchange Act and apply to issuers regardless of any involvement
in foreign bribery or overseas operations. In addition, because the
provisions contain no special sanction, they subject violating issuers to
the existing sanctions of the Exchange Act, which include wide en-
forcement remedies8 and criminal liability.9 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission has responded to this regulatory potential by
interpreting the new accounting requirements to authorize more direct
6. (2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 78!
of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section
78o(d) of this title shall-
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer...
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
7. (2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781
of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section
78o(d) of this title shall...
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other
criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
8. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1976) (broad investigative authority
for suspected violations); § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976) (power to subpoena witnesses
and require production of records); § 21(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976) (power to seek
civil injunction); Rule 2(e) of SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1979) (dis-
ciplinary administrative actions barring professionals from practicing before the SEC). In
addition, because the accounting provisions amended section 13 of the Exchange Act, ad-
ministrative proceedings under section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(4)
(1976), might be available. Under this provision, if the SEC finds that any person has
violated section 13, the Commission can publish its findings and issue an order requiring
such person to comply with section 13 in the terms and conditions it specifies. See Block
& Barton, Administrative Proceedings to Enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7
SEC. REG. L.J. 40 (1979) (use of section 15(c)(4) proceedings to remedy FCPA violations
would provide appropriate alternative to traditional injunctive actions).
9. See Exchange Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976) (willful violations of any




agency involvement in the internal affairs of registered corporations.
Such an interpretation could greatly increase public influence in
corporate governance. 10
This Note argues that those provisions were intended only to rein-
force the existing disclosure framework of the Exchange Act, and that
further SEC involvement in corporate affairs beyond this framework is
an unauthorized and unwarranted exercise of agency discretion. The
Note proposes a set of guidelines that would enable the SEC to protect
investors under the disclosure mandate of the Exchange Act, as amend-
ed by the new accounting provisions, without intervening unduly in
corporate governance.
I. The SEC's Expansive Interpretation of the Accounting Provisions
The accounting provisions of the FCPA were framed in ambiguous,
far-ranging terms that could be interpreted as expanding the scrutiny
of the Exchange Act to reach management decisionmaking. The SEC
has adopted such an interpretation, assuming a more active supervisory
role over the internal operations and structure of corporations.
A. The Ambiguous Language of the Accounting Amendments
The SEC, the chief enforcement agency under the Exchange Act,"
was the source of the FCPA accounting standards.' 2 Those standards,
however, are described ambiguously in the statute, using such unde-
fined terms as "accurately and fairly" and "reasonable assurances."' 3
10. "Corporate governance" as used in this Note refers to the organizational structure
and management hierarchy controlling the internal operations of the corporation. See
The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 1, at 4, 8-9 (1977) (testimony of Philip Loomis, SEC Commis-
sioner, discussing distinction between corporate governance and corporate accountability,
and the SEC's role in each). But see AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, RUNNING THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION vii (1978) (describing a broader, popular usage of corporate governance which
encompasses the influences that determine what a corporation may or may not do).
I1. The SEC has authority to sue issuers for civil violations of the Act under the FCPA
provisions, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (Supp. II 1978), and pre-existing section 21 of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976). The Justice Department has authority to sue domestic con-
cerns for civil violations of the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (Supp. II 1978), and to
prosecute both issuers and domestic concerns for criminal violations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l,
78dd-2 (Supp. II 1978). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4109-10.
12. The Senate version of the FCPA, S. 305, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), adopted the
amendments to section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act that the SEC had suggested in its
May 12 Report. The wording of the provisions eventually adopted by the conference
committee was virtually identical to that earlier version. Compare MAY 12 REPoRT, supra
note 4, at 63-64 with H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (Supp. II 1978).
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This lack of specificity, combined with the amendments' applicability
to all business activities of issuers registered under the Exchange Act,
invites broad coverage.' 4 By relying upon the suggestions of the SEC,'6
and by adopting such vague language, Congress made possible expansive
SEC interpretation of the FCPA accounting standards.
Congress did qualify the accurate record-keeping requirement with
the phrase "in reasonable detail"; 16 it also recognized the need for
cost-benefit considerations in the development by management of an
internal control system.' 7 Congress failed, however, to incorporate a
materiality standard' into the accounting provisions. Because an ac-
counting breach need not result in material reporting distortions in
order to constitute a violation, the provisions have caused widespread
confusion among managements and independent auditors concerning
the adequacy of recording and internal control systems.' 9 Managers are
forced to choose between the risk of violating the statute and the
necessity of constructing elaborate and expensive control systems.
The imprecise limitation on the type of controls encompassed by
the internal controls amendment also contributes to the confusion
surrounding its interpretation. The amendment's definition of the ob-
jectives of the internal control system was derived 20 from the description
14. Cf. Block & Barton, supra note 8, at 52-53 ("unrestrained use" of section 15(c)(4) in
contested proceedings, coupled with far-reaching provisions of the FCPA "would make this
enforcement tool a potent weapon in the hands of the Commission').
15. Congress engaged in relatively limited discussion of the accounting aspects of the
bribery problem and instead relied on the assertions of the SEC. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 4, at 4104-05.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978). The conference committee adopted the
"in reasonable detail" qualification to the accurate and fair requirement "in light of the
concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude and
precision which is unrealistic." H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4121, 4122 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT
with page citations to U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws].
17. This consideration would permit managerial discretion in complying with the
standard. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4106.
18." Materiality is a basic feature of financial accounting: financial reporting is only
concerned with information that is significant enough to affect evaluations or decisions.
Accounting Principles Board Statement No. 4, Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles
Underlying Financial Statements of Business Enterprises 128 (Oct. 1970), reprinted in
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 437, 461 (1979).
In considering whether misstatements are material, one factor to be considered is the dollar
magnitude of the effects, as well as the pervasiveness of the misstatement in the financial
statements taken as a whole. [1979-1] AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AU § 509.16 [hereinafter cited to AU sections]. See notes 31 &
52 infra (describing materiality standard in context of SEC's disclosure rules and Ex-
change Act).
19. See, e.g., Cook & Kelley, Internal Accounting Control: A Matter of Law, J. Ac-
COUNTANCY, Jan. 1979, at 56, 60 (discussing confusion concerning extent of possible viola-
tions); Schiff & Sorter, An Accountant Is Not a Chairman, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1979, § 3,
at 16, col. 3 (internal control section has created confusion by incorporating language
originally designed for quite different purposes).
20. See SENATE REPORT, suPra note 4, at 4105.
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SEC Intervention
in accounting literature of accounting controls,2 1 as distinguished from
administrative controls. Accounting controls are concerned with the
physical safeguarding of assets in processing transactions and with the
reliable recording of such asset dispositions.2 2 Administrative controls,
on the other hand, are concerned with the organizational structure and
system of management authorization; they insure that decisions are
reached in accordance with the corporation's overall objectives.2 3 The
definitions are not mutually exclusive, and the line between them is
difficult to draw. 24 Both are facets of a company's general internal con-
trol system, and any accounting control system involves a corresponding
set of administrative controls.
2 5
Hence, if the distinction between administrative and accounting
controls is not maintained, the statutory reach into corporate decisions
is unlimited. A literal reading of the internal controls amendment's
requirement that transactions be executed in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization could extend Exchange Act
coverage to a system of administrative controls.2 6 For example, a lower
management decision to solicit sales in a territory that upper manage-
ment has chosen not to serve could be viewed as unauthorized by upper
management, or inconsistent with corporate objectives. Expenditures
on research for a product already being manufactured, although prop-
erly recorded and intentional, could similarly be considered to violate
the FCPA internal control requirement.
27
21. The definition of the objectives of a system of accounting control contained in
subparagraphs (i)-(iv) of section 13(b)(2)(B), see note 7 supra (quoting statutory language),
was taken from AICPA auditing standards, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1 (Nov.
1972), See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, § 320.28
(defining accounting control).
22. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, § 320.28.
23. Id. § 320.27.
24. Id. § 320.29.
25. Id. § 320.27 (administrative controls are starting point for establishing accounting
controls).
26. The authoritative auditing literature admits that the definition of accounting con-
trol could be interpreted broadly to mean that protection of existing assets and acquisi-
tion of additional assets is the primary function of management and that any procedures
or records entering into management's decisionmaking processes are comprehended in that
definition. Id. § 320.14. The AICPA standard rejected this broad definition and adopted
a narrower definition. Id. § 320.19. The courts could adopt this broader, literal defini-
tion of accounting control as used in section 13(b)(2)(B) (the internal controls amendment)
on the ground that section 13(b)(2)(B) is aimed at management, whereas the accounting
literature is aimed at the auditor and the examination of the financial statements, and
that the accounting literature therefore is not dispositive. See Schiff & Sorter, supra note
19 (describing differing aims of the accounting literature and the FCPA).
27. Other examples of decisions that could be evidence of improper administrative
controls, and of improper accounting controls under a broad definition, are a manage-
ment decision to sell a product at a price that proves to be unprofitable, or a manage-
ment decision to incur expenditures for equipment that proves to be inefficient, for
materials that prove to be unsatisfactory in production, for merchandise that proves to be
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B. The SEC's Actions Under Section 13(b)(2)
Relying on these ambiguities, the SEC has acted to strengthen its
role in corporate governance. In particular, the agency's interpretation
of the FCPA accounting provisions has developed along lines inde-
pendent both of foreign bribery and of financial materiality. The first
court action brought by the SEC under the FCPA, SEC v. Aminex
Resources Corp.,2 contained no claims of foreign bribery or question-
able payments, indicating the independent importance of the account-
ing amendments.2 9 In subsequent enforcement actions that did involve
foreign payments, the Commission has questioned the proper func-
tioning of internal administrative controls over corporate expenditures
and has alleged defects in internal accounting controls from evidence
of unrecorded transactions.3" The accounting violations in these en-
forcement proceedings have not always been material to resulting
financial disclosures.
3 1
unsaleable, or for research that proves to be unproductive. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CER-
TIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, § 320.14. But see Cook & Kelley, supra note 19,
at 60 (Congress did not intend recognition of such types of violations).
28. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,352 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 1978).
29. The action charged the corporation, its president, vice-president, and various owned
companies with violations of new section 13(b)(2) and the antifraud and reporting provi-
sions of the Exchange Act in connection with the misappropriation and diversion of at
least S1.24 million of corporate assets, which had been disguised by maintaining false
entries on the corporate books and records. Id. A consent judgment was reached providing
ancillary relief including the establishment of a proper system of accounting controls. See
SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,458,
at 93,657-58 (D.D.C. May 24, 1978).
In fact, only one of the six cases brought by the SEC under the FCPA has charged
violations of the antibribery provisions, see SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., 469 SEC. RFG. & L.
REP. (BNA) A-1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1978) (charging Katy Industries and two of its di-
rectors with making payments of $316,250 to an Indonesian official and his associates to
obtain $10 million contract with country's state-owned oil and gas company), although
the case against Aminex was the only one not involving foreign payments.
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH)
96,393 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978) (alleging violations of sections 13(b)(2), 10(b), 13(a) and
14(a) of the Exchange Act). The complaint alleged that the corporation had made pay-
ments in excess of $2.5 million to foreign officials in connection with over S60 million
of sales of goods and services by Page between 1971 and 1978. Id. at 93,391. The SEC
alleged that the disbursements had been improperly and incompletely recorded as sales
discounts and service payments and that Page's internal control system was not adequate
to determine whether the "services provided" in connection with the falsely-labeled ex-
penditures "were commensurate with the amounts paid." Id. at 93,392. Such analysis of
the adequacy and need for services is an example of an administrative, not an accounting,
function, which should not be encompassed under section 13(b)(2)(B) (the internal con-
trols amendment), at least outside of the specific foreign bribery context.
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,393, at 93,391 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978) (payments of S2.5 million in connection with
$60 million sales); SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., 469 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-I (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 30, 1978) (payments of $316,250 in connection with $10 million contract). Although
such amounts would not be financially material under the accounting definition of
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In addition, the public pronouncements and rulemaking proceed-
ings of the SEC have emphasized the breadth and importance of the
new accounting provisionsA2 The first two rules promulgated under
the amendments prohibit falsification of corporate books and records33
and prohibit making any false or misleading statements to accountants
in connection with an audit.34 Adoption of these rules signified that the
SEC believes that the accounting amendments give it authority to enact
rules expressly governing the conduct of individuals within the corpora-
tion. In promulgating the rules, the SEC emphasized -that the FCPA
accounting provisions were not concerned exclusively with the prepara-
tion of financial statements35 and that these new requirements might
provide an independent basis for enforcement actions, whether or not
materiality, see note 18 supra, disclosure of such immaterial foreign bribery might be
permissible given Congress' intent to use section 13(b)(2) to reinforce the criminalization
of foreign bribery, see note 4 supra. The SEC has indicated, however, that no materiality
standard would be applied to any section 13(b)(2) violation, whether or not it involves
foreign pa)ments. See SECURMES AND EXCHANGE CONM[AssION, 44TH ANNUAL REPORT 21
(1978) (enforcement actions available under FCPA accounting requirements even if viola-
tions do not lead to dissemination of materially false information).
The SEC's disclosure rules and enforcement actions are generally limited to information
that is material. See Herlihy & Levine, suPra note 4, at 570. The SEC departed from the
economic materiality standard earlier in its enforcement actions for nondisclosure of ques-
tionable payments prior to the FCPA, alleging that foreign bribery was material in a
nonquantitative sense. See id. at 573-77 (describing materiality of questionable payments
per se). But see note 98 infra (criticizing SEC's per se rule of materiality).
32. See, e.g., Opening Statement of Harold Williams, SEC Chairman, at SEC's Consid-
eration of Rulemaking Proposals Announced in Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,185,
at 1 (Jan. 31, 1979) (agency must be "responsible in giving substance to this broad new
mandate").
33. Rule 13b2-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-I (1979).
34. Rule 13b2-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (1979).
These substantive prohibitions were included in the May 12 Report's suggested legisla-
tion, as proposed amended sections 13(b)(3) and 13(b)(4). MAY 12 REPORT, supra note 4, at
64. When Congress adjourned without taking final action on the legislation, the Com-
mission, on January 19, 1977, published proposed rules for public comment in language
substantially identical to its four legislative proposals submitted to Congress, basing its
authority to promulgate such rules on existing section 23(a) of the Exchange Act. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 13,185, 42 Fed. Reg. 4854 (1977). The Senate then adopted the
four proposals in its version of the bill, but limited the prohibitions of proposed sections
13(b)(3) and 13(b)(4) to "knowingly" falsifying any book or record or "knowingly" making
false or misleading statements to auditors, respectively, so that "inadvertent misstate-
ments" or "minor discrepancies arising from an unwitting error in judgment" would not
be actionable. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4107.
The conference committee later rejected these two sections and deleted them from
the FCPA, because it did not want to turn the legislation into a discussion of the
scienter requirement of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 16, at 4123. The SEC then withdrew the first two of its earlier rule
proposals, which had been incorporated into the FCPA, and adopted the other two as
Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2, without any scienter requirement, basing its authority on sec-
tions 23(a) and 13(b)(2). Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,964
(1979).
35. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 44 Fed. Reg. 10,964, 10,966 (1979).
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their violation resulted in dissemination of materially false or mislead-
ing information 30
Two recent actions, justified under the authority of the amendments,
further indicate the SEC's expansive use of its FCPA jurisdiction. In
April 1979, the SEC proposed a rule3 7 that would have required man-
agement to include a statement of its internal accounting controls on
Form 10-K 38 and in annual reports to security holders.39 Although an
earlier private sector study had advocated voluntary reports of similar
information, 40 the SEC took the initiative to propose requiring the
reports under the internal controls amendment to the Exchange Act.
4 1
The Commission remarked that management's evaluation and related
responsibility for internal controls might extend to "the overall con-
trol environment," involving consideration of "the organizational struc-
ture, including the role of the board of directors.
' 42
36. Id. at 10,966-67.
37. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,772, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,702 (1979) [herein-
after cited as April 30 Release].
38. Id. Form 10-K is the SEC's filing form for annual reports required of issuers
registered under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1979).
39. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1979) (requiring annual report be furnished to share-
holders and specifying report's contents),
The proposed internal control report was to be implemented in two steps: from
December 15, 1979 to December 15, 1980, management was to give an opinion whether
the internal control system provided reasonable assurance that the specified objectives of
the FCPA requirements of section 13(b)(2)(B) were being achieved, and to describe any
material weaknesses in internal accounting control communicated by the independent
accountants which had not been corrected. April 30 Release, supra note 37, 44 Fed. Reg.
at 26,703-06; cf. note 95 infra (describing current investigation and report by independent
accountants on internal control). During the second step, from December 15, 1980 on, an
independent public accountant was to report whether management's opinion of the
adequacy of its internal accounting controls was truthful and reasonable in light of the
accountant's own evaluation. April 30 Release, supra note 37, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,706-07.
40. See THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT, CONCLUSIONS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS 76-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as COHEN COMMISSION REPORT].
41. April 30 Release, supra note 37, 44 Fed Reg. at 26,709.
The federal securities laws authorize the Commission to prescribe accounting practices
to be applied in the preparation and presentation of financial statements included in
filings with the Commission. The Commission, however, has historically looked to the
standard-setting bodies designated by the accounting profession to provide leadership in
establishing and improving accounting and auditing principles. Accounting Series Release
No. 4, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,912 (1938); Accounting Series Release No. 150, 38 Fed. Reg. 1260
(1973). The SEC recognized the work of the Cohen Commission and the subsequent tenta-
tive AICPA recommendations, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS,
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORTS BY MANAGEMENT SPECIAL
ADvIsoRY COMMIrTEE (Dec. 8, 1978), but felt such a management report on internal con-
trol should be required, not simply permitted, and should not be limited to errors or
irregularities that could be material to the financial statements. April 30 Release, supra
note 37, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,702-03. The SEC also attempted to justify such disclosure
under the pre-existing framework of the Exchange Act, believing that the information
might be necessary to the interests of investors and other users of financial information
to evaluate management's performance of its "stewardship responsibilities." Id.
42. April 30 Release, supra note 37, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,705. On May 28, 1980, in the
wake of substantial public opposition, the SEC withdrew its proposed rule. Securities Ex-
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Finally, the SEC has suggested that it could use the new accounting
requirements to mandate independent audit committees for public
companies. Shortly after the enactment of the FCPA, the SEC General
Counsel responded to the Chairman's inquiry whether the Commission
could require audit committees with an opinion that the most explicit
authority for such a rule was the FCPA internal controls amend-
ment.43 Although such a committee was not considered an element of
internal control, it was to be deemed a "necessary means" of insuring
that the internal control system was "operating in the manner in-
tended." 4
4
II. The Accounting Amendments Interpreted Within the
Disclosure Framework of the Exchange Act
The record-keeping and internal controls amendments added by the
FCPA to the Exchange Act can be interpreted so as to have broad
applicability independent of any involvement in foreign bribery. But
expansive use of the new accounting provisions as statutory authority
for direct intervention into corporate governance would distort the
disclosure framework and purpose of the Exchange Act, to which the
requirements were appended. The provisions should instead be in-
terpreted as strengthening the reliability of the financial disclosure
system. The adequacy of record-keeping and accounting control systems
should be judged only by the accuracy of resulting financial statements.
A. The Disclosure Framework of the Exchange Act
To determine the extent of the SEC's authority under the account-
ing amendments, it is necessary to examine the statutory framework of
the Exchange Act. The Act was designed to protect investors by pro-
viding them with an open market that would value securities at their
fair price. The Act's primary means of achieving that market was by
change Act Release No. 16,877, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,134 (1980). The SEC intends, however, to
monitor private-sector initiatives and solicit public comments until early 1982, when it
will reconsider the question of mandatory management reports. Id.
43. Opinion of SEC General Counsel on the Commission's Authority to Require Public
Companies to Establish Independent Audit Committees, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,535, at 80,181 (Mar. 2, 1978). Alternative justifications for such a
requirement under other sections were remarkably tenuous. See, e.g., id. at 80,180 (sug-
gesting that SEC could require issuers to file periodic statements representing that auditors
are engaged by independent audit committee, and that, because false or misleading state-
ments are prohibited under the Exchange Act, this would have the effect of requiring
issuers to establish independent audit committees).
44. Id. at 80,181. The SEC is currently evaluating the existing prevalence of audit
committees and plans to consider, on concluding its investigation, whether it should re-
quire the establishment of audit committees. See Securities and Exchange Commission
Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,120, at 81,956 (June 28, 1979).
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disclosure of information materially important to investors, 45 a system
intended to enable investors to make informed investment decisions40
and shareholders to exercise their suffrage rights. 47 Disclosure was also
intended to prevent securities manipulation and to protect investors
from fraud.
48
Congress adopted disclosure as a regulatory method because of its
desire to minimize governmental intervention in corporate affairs.40
The Exchange Act intended disclosure to reveal only those activities
prohibited by independent law or clearly material to investor in-
terests. 50 The courts, and even the SEC, have recognized that, given
Congress' adoption of the disclosure mechanism, substantive regula-
tion of business is beyond the SEC's statutory discretion.5' The ma-
45. Congress rejected direct regulation of corporate organization by the federal govern-
ment and instead adopted a limited approach designed to enhance securities distribution
and trading processes. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1383]; Sommer, The Impact of the SEC on Corporate Governance,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1977, at 115, 118.
46. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 45, at 11.
47. Id. at 13-14.
48. Such activities depend on nondisclosure for their effect. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92-104 (1914); Anderson, The Disclosure
Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 329-31
(1974); Sommer, supra note 45, at 119.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 45, at 3; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1934) (Senate version contained subsection 13(d) which provided that nothing in act
should be construed to authorize Commission to interfere with management of affairs of
an issuer); see Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, 8 FORTUNE 53, 55 (Aug. 1933)
(until less drastic remedies fail, federal government should not embark on federal incor-
poration or exercise direct control over investments); Anderson, supra note 48, at 319-20;
Sommer, supra note 45, at 118.
50. See notes 31 & 48 supra.
51. See SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1178 (E.D. Va. 1977)
(SEC and courts are bound to respect limits inherent in statutory scheme aimed at ensuring
disclosure in securities sales and not substantive regulation of business itself); Securities
Act Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,660 (1975) (environmental disclosure; Com-
mission may not require disclosure solely in order to affect directly corporate conduct);
cf. ADVISORY CoMMFrrEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COssssION D-8, 318-19 (Comm. Print 1977) (suggesting Com-
mission adopt statement of objectives recognizing that it should not adopt disclosure
requirements that have as their principal objective the regulation of corporate conduct).
But cf. Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5906, [1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,505, at 80,048 (Feb. 15, 1978) (rejecting Advisory Com-
mittee's suggestion, because Congress was aware that decisions on required disclosure fre-
quently affect conduct).
Several commentators have suggested active use of the disclosure mechanism to coerce
and restructure corporate conduct, see, e.g., Sonde & Pitt, Utilizing the Federal Securities
Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!", 16 How. L.J. 831 (1971) (sug-
gesting disclosure of activities in area of environmental protection as additional weapon
in federal arsenal directed at environmental problems); Weiss & Schwartz, Using Disclosure
to Activate the Board of Directors, LAw & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1977, at 63 (advocating
use of disclosure to strengthen board of directors), while at the same time they admit the
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teriality standard52 defines the limit of that discretion, preventing un-
due interference in internal corporate affairs.
The use of the Exchange Act's disclosure mechanism to intrude into
the corporate structure, therefore, is devoid of statutory authority.
Furthermore, the limited legislative history of the amendments 53 in-
dicates no contrary intention. Apart from their role in the criminaliza-
tion of foreign bribery, the accounting standards were installed in order
to strengthen the honesty of the record-keeping process, thus reinforcing
the existing system of corporate disclosure and enhancing public con-
fidence in the securities markets. 54 Congress demonstrated no intent
to alter the basic non-interventionist tenor of the Exchange Act in areas
other than foreign payments.
B. Section 13(b)(2) as Reinforcing Financial Disclosure Accuracy
The accounting provisions should be interpreted in the context of
the Exchange Act and thus should be enforced with the aim of provid-
ing material information to investors. Because a corporation's account-
ing system is designed to provide financial information, materiality in
such a context refers to the relative size of any distortions in reported
amounts.5 5 A corporation's books and records, regulated under the
record-keeping amendment, should be sufficient to generate reliable
financial statements containing no material omissions or misstatements.
SEC's lack of authority independently and substantively to regulate the conduct to be
disclosed, Sonde & Pitt, supra, at 849; Weiss & Schwartz, supra, at 77 n.65, 84 n.93. But see,
e.g., Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 647-48 (1964)
(unanswered question whether securities laws can be used to force additional corporate
disclosures that may be in public interest but cannot be justified as necessary for investor
protection). Indeed, the SEC was criticized prior to the enactment of the FCPA for its
attempt to prohibit corporate bribery by requiring disclosure of foreign payments, because
it had no authority to forbid such payments. See Freeman, The Legality of the SEC's
Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus. LAW. 1095 (1976); Note, Disclosure of Payments to
Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848 (1976).
Officers of the SEC attempted to justify such foreign bribery disclosures as being material
to the investing public, see Doherty, The SEC's Management Fraud Program, 31 Bus.
LAW. 1279, 1280 (1976); note 31 supra, but admitted that they felt such foreign payments
should be prohibited, see Sommer, The Disclosure of Management Fraud, 31 Bus. LAW.
1283, 1292-93 (1976). See note 98 infra (discussing such materiality reasoning).
52. See note 18 supra. Courts have developed the materiality standard for determining
when omitted or misstated securities disclosures are actionable: the information is material
if a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding whether to invest, or, in
proxy cases, if a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
384 (1970).
53. See note 15 supra.
54. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 4105; see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 16, at
4122.
55. See note 18 supra.
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Materially inaccurate financial statements would indicate that the com-
pany's books are not adequate and would violate that section.
Similarly, a corporation's system of internal accounting controls is
designed to safeguard the assets of the company and insure that transac-
tions are properly recorded, permitting the preparation of reliable
financial statements.5 6 The system should be deemed sufficient for
financial disclosure purposes if it makes possible the generation of
financial statements presenting the financial condition of the corpora-
tion without material omissions or distortions. Minor breaches in in-
ternal accounting controls that allow only non-material asset losses or
that do not prevent proper accountability for material amounts should
not be actionable. The SEC should only remedy internal accounting
control defects under the internal controls amendment when they affect
the integrity of the reporting process. Administrative controls over the
decisionmaking process are not proper subjects for enforcement under
the new provisions, because such controls are not concerned with the
reliability of the investor-informing process.
The SEC has claimed that disclosure of internal control weaknesses
and off-the-books recording, independent of any financial statement
effects, is material to investors in the broad sense of assisting them in
evaluating management integrity.57 Most studies on disclosures of im-
proper activity during the SEC voluntary program, however, indicate
that such disclosures have at most a minor effect on investor evalua-
tion.58 The materiality of disclosing such weaknesses is thus highly
56. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, §§ 320.19,
320.28.
57. April 30 Release, supra note 37, 44 Fed. Reg. at 26,702-03.
58. In a study of the transactions volume and stock price changes of securities of
seventy-four firms that disclosed foreign payments from April 1975 through May 1976,
Paul A. Griffin found that (1) the transactions volume for firms during the weeks sur-
rounding disclosure was generally greater than the volume for similar non-disclosing firms,
and firms that disclosed significant dollar payments experienced a higher transactions
volume than those that did not; (2) the variability of residual price changes was greater
for disclosing firms in the week following announcement, and firms disclosing significant
dollar transactions were more affected than those whose payments were small or imma-
terial; and (3) the firms disclosing sensitive foreign payments experienced a small,
temporary decline in the value of their common shares, but within two to three weeks
the security price reverted back to normal levels. See Griffin, Sensitive Foreign Payment
Disclosures: The Securities Market Impact, reprinted in ADvIsORY COMMITTEE ON COR-
PORATE DISCLOSURE, supra note 51, at 694-743. Griffin concluded that agents seem to re-
spond differentially to the amount of the payments, and that the degree of concern by
those in government did not appear commensurate with the small temporary impact of
the disclosure on the value of the corporation. Id. at 730-34. Another, seemingly inconclu-
sive, study of a sampling of eight companies disclosing foreign payments between March
25 and April 1, 1976, found that the declines in securities prices immediately following
announcement were subsequently largely compensated for. Note, supra note 51, at 1855
n.45. Even a former SEC Commissioner has admitted that the "impact of these disclosures
upon the behavior of corporate America would appear to exceed by far the impact on
investors." Sommer, supra note 45, at 135.
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doubtful. Furthermore, this wider standard of materiality, based on
notions of general investor relevancy, would make it difficult to estab-
lish any limits on disclosure requirements.59
The SEC itself earlier endorsed a strict materiality standard regard-
ing non-financial disclosures. In response to a petition to adopt compre-
hensive disclosures regarding environmental and fair employment prac-
tices,60 the SEC adopted rules requiring disclosure only of material
financial effects of compliance with environmental laws. 6 1 After judicial
instruction to consider the "ethical investor" interest in such informa-
tion, 62 the SEC refused to broaden the disclosure requirements, claim-
ing that its authority was limited to disclosure of economically signif-
icant information in a narrow sense. 63
This position is consistent with the original framework of the Ex-
change Act, unlike the more recent use of disclosure under the FCPA
amendments to regulate corporate affairs on the basis of general in-
vestor relevancy. 4 A proper materiality qualification for the new ac-
59. Many sorts of disclosures concerning corporate officers-including political affilia-
tions, investment holdings, charitable contributions, employment practices, environmental-
protection efforts-could be required under such a broad standard, because these data also
arguably reflect management integrity. See Friedman & Leonard, Integrity and Manage-
ment Disclosures: The Disclosure of Matters Bearing on Competence and Integrity, 7
INST. SEC. REc. 1, 14 (1976). Thus the general-investor-relevancy standard is unacceptably
broad. By tying investor relevancy regarding books and records and internal controls to a
financial-statement-materiality standard, relevancy can be determined on a consistent,
quantifiable, and acceptably limited basis.
60. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693-95 (D.D.C.
1974).
61. Securities Act Release No. 5386, 38 Fed. Reg. 12,100 (1973) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§§ 239.11, 239.22, 239.26, 249.210, 249.308, 249.310 (1979)).
62. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 700 (D.D.C. 1974).
The court noted that ethical investors might believe that awareness of and sensitivity to
environmental problems was the mark of intelligent management. It thus could not say
that such information was not material within the meaning of the securities laws. Id.
63. Securities Act Release No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (1975); Securities Act Release
No. 5704, 41 Fed. Reg. 21,632 (1976) (adopting limited disclosures regarding capital ex-
penditures for environmental compliance purposes while rejecting broader proposals). The
SEC felt the disclosed information should only be appropriate for the protection of in-
vestors or the furtherance of fair and informed securities markets. Securities Act Release
No. 5627, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656, 51,660 (1975). It believed that equal opportunity information
could not be distinguished from over 100 other matters of social concern suggested as
topics for disclosure, including biographical information regarding directors, interlocking
directorates, control within a corporation, the role of the board of directors, and political
contributions. Id. at 51,666 & n.72. An appellate court finally sustained this exercise of dis-
cretion after deciding its review of the substantive rationality of the SEC's decision had
to be narrow in scope. Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, [1979 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,832 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 26, 1979). The court noted that the Com-
mission concluded that ethical investors were typically uninterested in the comprehensive
disclosures suggested, and held that the SEC was, for this reason among others, justified
in its action. Id. at 95,354.
64. The SEC has also recently used disclosure to regulate corporate affairs under other
provisions. See Accounting Series Release No. 165, 40 Fed. Reg. 1010 (19,75) (proxy dis-
closure concerning audit committee); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,384, 43 Fed.
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counting provisions would provide an interpretation of the FCPA ac-
counting amendments in harmony with the Exchange Act disclosure
mechanism.
III. Guidelines for Narrative Disclosures
Under the Amended Exchange Act
The interpretive inconsistencies arising from an expansive use of the
accounting provisions of the FCPA suggest the need for developing
explicit guidelines for SEC narrative disclosure65 requirements. Such
guidelines should be based on investment analysis principles. This
would allow the SEC to achieve the goals of investor and suffrage
protection under the Exchange Act without intervening in internal
corporate affairs.
A. A Framework for Disclosure
Narrative disclosures may be analyzed according to the results they
achieve; those results can be classified in terms of group pressure,
enforcement, and informative effects. 66 Only the enforcement and in-
formative effects justify disclosures under the Exchange Act.
1. Group Pressure Effect
Disclosure can alter conduct by invoking group pressure against the
discloser.6 The efficacy of disclosure for group pressure depends on
the number and nature of the recipients, the degree to which they feel
their vital interests are affected, and the range of alternative protective
means available to them.68
Reg. 58,522 (1978) (disclosure concerning corporate boards of directors); MAY 12 REPORT,
supra note 4, at 6-13 (describing voluntary disclosure program for questionable payments
to avoid SEC enforcement action). The SEC justified these disclosure requirements in
general terms of relevance to evaluating managerial integrity. See Accounting Series Re-
lease No. 165, 40 Fed. Reg. 1010, 1012 (1975); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,384,
43 Fed. Reg. 58,522, 58,523 (1978); MAY 12 REPORT, supra note 4, at 19-20. Disclosure of
such foreign bribery, management committees, and internal controls would seem to be
indistinguishable from some of the 100 suggested disclosure items rejected by the SEC in
1976, see note 63 supra, as being irrelevant to investors and shareholders.
65. "Narrative disclosure" as used in this section refers to disclosure of non-financial
information; that is, qualitative data not incorporated into the financial statements.
66. See Note, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1273, 1273-76 (1963).
67. Id. at 1274. This "group pressure" effect is to be distinguished from the "informa-
tive" effect of disclosure, under which the recipient may be able, by acting on his evalua-
tion of the disclosed information, to protect his personal interests without having to alter
the future conduct of the disclosers. Id. at 1274-75.
68. See id. at 1282.
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The lack of enthusiasm with which shareholders60 exercise their
limited control70 over corporate management has led many com-
mentators to doubt the desirability of increasing their supervisory
power over management decisionmaking.71 For most shareholders, dis-
investing is a more cost-effective response to unsatisfactory management
conduct than voting to alter such conduct.7 2 Disinvestment may itself
have an effect analogous to group pressure, in that it could alter man-
agement conduct indirectly by lowering stock prices; 73 for this to occur,
however, the revealed conduct must be serious enough to provoke ex-
tensive disinvestment. For these reasons, disclosure used for its group
pressure effect is a less effective deterrent to undesirable management
conduct than is direct legislation.74
69. SEC-mandated disclosure under the Exchange Act is designed to benefit share-
holders. See p. 1582 supra.
70. Shareholders generally can only approve or reject proposed candidates for the
board, charter amendments, and major corporate transformations. See, e.g., Brudney &
Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REv. 297, 299-
300 (1974) (describing ineffectiveness of shareholder voting in approving mergers); Man-
ning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958) (reviewing J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN
STOCKHOLDER (1958) and describing shareholder impotency).
71. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 180 (1969) (questions of public policy do
not lend themselves to solution through reorganization of corporate decisionmaking
mechanism); Jones, The Relations between the Board of Directors and Operating Manage-
ment, in AMERICAN ASSEMLY, supra note 10, at 96, 102 (shareholders interested in financial
results, not participation in corporate affairs); Manning, The Shareholder"s Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 261 (1962) (modern shareholder is
investor, not owner or manager).
72. Members of an organization can respond to its deterioration by two mechanisms:
"exit," the separation of the member from the organization, for example, by security
disinvestment, and "voice," the expression of dissatisfaction directly to management, for
example, by shareholder voting. Both mechanisms can alert management and induce the
firm's recovery. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXiT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 4, 15-16 (1970). The role of voice
will generally decrease as the opportunities for exit increase. Id. at 34. When both are
available, the readiness to resort to voice over exit will depend on the substitutability of
other organizations, and the extent to which the member can alter conduct. Id. at 36-41.
Because disinvesting in publicly held corporations through the stock market is easy, close
security substitutes are available, and altering corporate conduct is costly, informed share-
holders will react to management deterioration through exit, rather than voice. Id. at 46.
73. Cf. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
Durr L.J. 231, 236-37 (describing pressure on management to keep share prices up). If
management cannot respond to such pressure, lowered stock prices might induce a takeover
that would replace existing management. Id. at 238-41.
74. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, and Reform, 92 HARv. L. REv. 549, 579-80 (1979) (comparing disclosure regulation
with standards governing primary conduct). Although disclosure is less restrictive, it is
only effective when the public can understand the information and choose on the basis
of it. Id. at 580. Because shareholders will not act on disclosed information by either dis-
investing or voting unless they are very interested in its content, corporate disclosure will
not be effective in regulating many areas of corporate affairs.
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2. Enforcement Effect
Disclosure operates as an enforcement mechanism when it permits
investigation into, or forces exposure of, violations of substantive regu-
lations.7 5 Disclosure requirements are particularly effective in securities
regulation when they substitute private enforcement for agency regula-
tion of illegal conduct.
7 6
In order for the SEC to require public narrative corporate disclosures
as an enforcement tool, however, the underlying conduct must violate
existing statutory or common law norms, such as insider trading or
fraud, and there must be a pre-existing private right of action to remedy
the violation. 7 Disclosure should not be used to override legislative
determinations and create unintended private remedies.7 1 Moreover,
in order to justify the added cost of required disclosure, the SEC should
show that enforcement would be more difficult without it.7' Disclosure
as an enforcement device, therefore, is justifiable in only a limited
context.
3. Informative Effect
Disclosure is useful as an informative device when it enables the
recipient to protect his own interests without altering the discloser's
conduct. The Exchange Act was designed to provide information useful
to shareholders in two situations: the investment decision and the share-
holder voting decision. A criterion drawing on the courts' materiality
75. See Note, supra note 66, at 1273-74.
76. Section 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), provides an excellent
example of the use of narrative disclosure for its enforcement effect. See Note, supra
note 66, at 1280-82. Section 16(a) requires insiders to disclose their security holdings and
transactions, and thus enables private shareholders to sanction unwanted insider activity
under section 16(b), without requiring agency involvement. See id.
77. If the recipient of the information has no right to prevent any underlying prohibi-
tion, public disclosure serves no protective enforcement role.
78. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14 (1976) (rulemaking power
granted to administrative agency is not power to make law, but to adopt regulations to
carry into effect will of legislature).
79. The SEC has traditionally weighed the benefit of specific required disclosures
against the cost of that disclosure. See MAY 12 REPORT, suPra note 4, at 21. Such cost-
benefit analysis is consistent with recent executive and legislative actions minimizing the
costs of compliance with agency regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152
(1979) (requiring executive agencies to consider cost-effectiveness of regulations and to
file economic impact statement for agency proposals). Although, as an independent regula-
tory agency, the SEC is not bound by the Executive Order, suPra, it has been asked to
comply voluntarily with the Order's procedures. See 43 Fed. Reg. 12,665, 12,670 (1978). See
also S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. S861 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1979); S. 755, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONt. Rac. S3338 (daily. ed. Mar. 26, 1979) (proposals to require all
federal agencies to estimate and publish projected costs, benefits, and other impacts of
major regulations before adoption).
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standard should be applied in determining the propriety of narrative
disclosure for its informative effect. To serve its protective role, the
information disclosed must be considered significant in the investment
or voting decision.
Investment analysis principles s0 can be used to determine materiality
to the investment decision. An investor seeks to minimize risk while
maximizing return.8 ' For disclosures to be material to the investment
decision, then, they must affect an investor's evaluation of these factors,
which are directly reflected in the security's market price.82 In pro-
posing narrative disclosure under this view of materiality, the SEC
must correlate stock price responsiveness to the disclosure, thereby
demonstrating that cash-flow, timing, or risk predictions are affected
by the disclosure. Such responsiveness could be shown by studies of
market reactions to similar disclosures in previous cases.83
Similar reasoning suggests that proxy disclosure, designed for its in-
formative effect on the voting decision, be directly related to matters
within the scope of shareholder voting power.84 The SEC should
demonstrate that public disclosure is important to a particular decision
and require such disclosure in the related proxy materials. The SEC
will have no empirical guides to determine voting importance but
could justify the disclosure by the size of the shareholder constituency
interested in the type of uniform disclosure required. Disclosures ap-
pealing to more minor constituencies should be left to individual
shareholder initiative under the existing shareholder proposal provi-
sions of the proxy rules.
85
80. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, COPORATE FINANCE 1148-.70 (2d ed. 1979); J.
LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-167 (1973). Investors
are concerned with two aspects of a security: its risk and its return. V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, suPra, at 1144; see B. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 74-81
(1975). Return is based on the future cash-generating ability of the corporation and the
timing of such cash flows. Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Disclosure Policy,
31 Bus. LAw. 293, 301-04 (1975).
81. See W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 26-30 (1970).
82. Cf. Note, Utilization of Investment Analysis Principles in the Development of Dis-
closure Policy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292 (1977) (discussing
consistency between judicial standards of materiality and financial theories regarding
kinds of information material to investment process).
83. See, e.g., note 58 supra (discussing studies of effects of foreign bribery disclosure).
84. Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (correction of trivial or
unrelated proxy defect will not serve any protective purpose).
85. See Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1979) (requiring management to include
shareholder proposal and statement with proxy if shareholder notifies management of
his intention to present a proposal at forthcoming shareholders meeting). Such share-
holder proposal provisions can be used to bring socially responsible matters or topics of
particular interest to the attention of management. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN,
TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 80-83 (1976) (Campaign GM); Schwartz, The Public-In-
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B. Disclosure Guidelines Applied to Section 13(bX2)
The activities of the SEC in implementing the accounting provisions
of the FCPA can be evaluated according to these guidelines. Under such
an analysis, the SEC should refrain from using the accounting amend-
ments as a gToup pressure device to affect corporate conduct or struc-
ture. Substantive regulations over the internal conduct of corporate
officers, such as the adopted rules on record falsification and misleading
statements to auditors,8 6 are inappropriate uses of the accounting
amendments.8 7 Regulations that alter the corporate structure, such as
the possible requirement of audit committees, 88 are similarly unwar-
ranted because they attempt to achieve an interventionist, group pres-
sure effect.
8 9
Disclosure also cannot be used for its enforcement effect because the
accounting amendments do not grant any private right of action to
shareholders. Although the legislative history of the FCPA indicates
that some private right of action was intended for competitors suffering
injury from foreign bribery, 90 it does not refer to such a right under the
terest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REv. 419 (1971). The
most publicized instance, Campaign GM, attracted only 0.2% shareholder support, R.
NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra, at 81, and indicates the lack of sufficient share-
holder interest to require disclosure in areas of public concern such as environmental pro-
tection and employment discrimination.
86. See p. 1579 supra.
87. Even if the rules were qualified so that only officer violations leading to material
distortions in the financial statements were actionable, the rules would duplicate existing
prohibitions and be unnecessary. Under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), a private party can bring an
action against officers for making untrue statements of, or omitting to state, material facts
that are necessary to make those statements not misleading. See Ernst 8 Ernst v. Hoch-
felder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975).
88. See p. 1581 supra.
89. A regulation requiring audit committees would also be undesirable for practical
reasons because it would generate unrealizable expectations about the ability of such
committees to remedy "all the inadequacies of the present system of corporate governance."
See Greene & Falk, The Audit Committee-A Measured Contribution to Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Realistic Appraisal of its Objectives and Functions, 34 Bus. L.Aw. 1229, 1233-34
(1979); Jones, The Relations between the Board of Directors and Operating Management,
in AMERICAN AssEMBLY, supra note 10, at 96, 97-98 (audit committee can deal with financial
irregularities but is not a superboard dealing with social impact of corporate activities or
with ethical requirements in non-financial areas).
90. The House report indicated that a private right of action was to be implied for
foreign bribery violations under the House version of the bill. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). The Senate and conference committee reports contained no
mention of private rights of action. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 4; CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 16. Based on this and other evidence, the SEC's Office of the General Counsel
submitted its opinion that a private right of action should be implied for foreign bribery
under the FCPA. Opinion of Office of the General Counsel on the Existence of a Private
Right of Action Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, [1978 Transfer Binder]
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accounting provisions, 91 and the courts are unlikely to infer one.92 Re-
quiring management reports on internal controls in order to encourage
private enforcement of disclosed defects is thus not warranted.
The accounting provisions of the FCPA can be used to reinforce
directly the informative effect on investors of financial disclosures re-
quired under the Exchange Act. If a corporation's record-keeping and
internal control systems are not adequate to prevent the formulation
of materially misleading financial statements, then the FCPA account-
ing amendments give the SEC the authority to investigate and remedy
the underlying financial-statement-generation process, authority that
it previously lacked. 93 The SEC will be able to achieve more complete
preventive relief against future misleading disclosures by seeking to
establish adequate bookkeeping and internal control systems through
enforcement actions.9
4
In requiring narrative public disclosures under the accounting
amendments for their informative effect, especially outside the foreign
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,701 (May 16, 1978) [hereinafter cited as General Counsel
Opinion]. See Siegel, The Implication Doctrine and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 79
COLUM. L. Rav. 1085, 1104-16 (1979) (private cause of action for injunctive relief, but not
damages, should be implied for competitors under anti-bribery sections to provide preven-
tive enforcement).
91. The House version of the bill, H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REc.
H1313 (daily cd. Feb. 22, 1977), contained no accounting provisions, and the SEC opinion,
General Counsel Opinion, supra note 90, did not consider the accounting provisions.
92. See Siegel, supra note 90, at 1104-12,
93. Although the SEC has had authority under the securities laws to prescribe prin-
ciples to be used in the presentation of financial statements, see note 41 supra, section
13(b)(2) is the first statutory provision relating to the bookkeeping system behind such
statements. The SEC has obtained a broad range of ancillary remedies by consent in its
enforcement actions. See Block & Barton, supra note 8, at 45 (describing ancillary relief in
foreign payments consent decrees); Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement
Suits, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1779, 1779-1805 (1976) (describing increasing trend of granting
ancillary relief and rationale behind different measures). The courts, however, had ques-
tioned the power of the SEC to impose these remedies without the consent of the cor-
poration prior to the adoption of the FCPA. See generally SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 96,583, at 94,473 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 1978)
(absent considerable justification, court should not impose remedies that would regulate
areas traditionally left to internal corporate management); Block S- Barton, supra note 8,
at 45-46.
94. See Hycel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 14,981, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 81,676, at 80,730 (July 20, 1978) (adoption of internal accounting pro-
cedures under consent decree in SEC administrative proceedings particularly appropriate
in light of enactment of section 13(b)(2)). An example of the type of injunctive relief the
SEC will be able to achieve in contested proceedings under section 13(b)(2) is provided by
the consent decree obtained by the SEC in its enforcemnt action against ITT for the
making of questionable foreign payments prior to the FCPA. See SEC v. ITT, [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,948, at 95,959 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1979) (re-
quiring ITT to make and keep accurate books and records and devise and maintain
adequate system of internal accounting controls, in language identical to that of section
13(b)(2), even though action arose prior to enactment of section).
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bribery area, the SEC should adhere to guidelines based on investment
analysis principles. Mandatory public disclosure of ipternal control
systems or defects, for example, cannot be justified by their informative
effect on investors or shareholders. 95 If internal control defects do not
affect reported earnings, or if earnings can be determined by extended
auditing procedures,9 6 then investor predictions of future returns will
not be affected. Moreover, reports on the condition of past recording
or accounting control systems cannot aid in predicting the future cash-
generating ability of the corporation.97 Judging from minimal market
price reactions in the past to similar disclosures,98 information regard-
ing the extensiveness of internal accounting controls is unlikely to affect
95. The burden of such a required report would be extensive, for the scope of the
auditor's examination and responsibility would be greatly expanded in that, contrary to
common belief, see COHEN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 40, at 183-84 (survey showed
belief that auditor's standard report provided investors and shareholders with moderate to
high levels of assurance about adequacy of internal control system), the independent audi-
tor does not now examine the internal control system as such to determine its adequacy or
recommend suggestions for improvement to management. Under existing auditing stan-
dards, the auditor makes a study and evaluation of the internal accounting control system
for the limited purpose of forming a basis to determine the extent of the tests and scope
of the examination of the financial statements, see AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, § 323.02, although the auditor is required to com-
municate material weaknesses in internal accounting control that come to his attention
during his examination of the financial statements in a so-called management letter,
see id. § 323.04. The decision not to study the internal control system as such to evaluate
its adequacy is a cost-benefit decision, see id. § 323.03; the auditor "focuses directly on
• . . preventing or detecting material errors and irregularities" in the financial state-
ments. Id. § 320.65.
ITT bad estimated it would incur additional costs of $3 million if the proposed manage-
ment report were adopted. ITT, Response to SEC Proposed Statement of Management on
Internal Accounting Control 7 (July 20, 1979) (on file with SEC).
96. Under existing auditing practices, the auditor forms an opinion on the reliability
of the financial statements by both testing the internal control system and testing the
details of transactions, with the reliance on each determined by considering the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of the two tests in the circumstances. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE
OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 18, §§ 320.70-.73. If the auditor finds
material weaknesses in the internal control system, he is thus permitted to expand his
testing of transactions to satisfy himself as to the adequacy of the financial statements,
without undertaking an extensive evaluation or overhaul of the internal control system,
because such evaluation might be more costly than testing the reported transactions and
would not achieve any greater financial statement accuracy. However, if the defects in
internal control are so extensive that he could not rely on it, even with extensive evalua-
tion, he must expand his testing of transactions. See id.
97. See note 102 infra. Accounting control and recording deficiencies, as accounting
functions, also do not affect the actual cash-generating ability of the corporation.
98. See note 58 supra. In fact, the SEC justified its actions to force disclosure of ques-
tionable payments prior to the FCPA on the ground that such foreign payments affected
the risks of the corporation's operations, and hence were material to investors. See notes
31 & 51 supra. If the payments did not affect reported earnings from the operations, how-
ever, such as if they were mislabeled as other expenses, then such payments would not
necessarily affect the riskiness of operations because such payments could be customary
and prerequisite to doing business, and hence not reflecting on the corporation's com-
petitive strength. See Note, supra note 51, at 1859.
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the investment risk component. Such information probably is not
sufficiently relevant to evaluations of management competency or pre-
dictions of future earnings fluctuations.
Narrative internal control disclosures also cannot be justified in terms
of their informative value for shareholder voting. The board of direc-
tors, and not the shareholders, is responsible for electing the manage-
ment, supervising its day-to-day operations, and judging its compe-
tence.99 Because shareholders have no power to design, approve, or
disapprove management administrative or accounting functions, and
would rather disinvest than vote anyway,' 00 internal control disclosures
would serve no protective role' 0 ' and should not be mandated.
10 2
Conclusion
Congress incorporated accounting provisions into the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act in order to reinforce the protective disclosure system
of the Exchange Act. Such provisions, though vaguely framed, can serve
a protective role in strengthening the accuracy of financial disclosures
99. Friedman & Leonard, supra note 59, at 15.
100. See p. 1587 supra.
101. Similarly, it appears that the SEC program of foreign payment disclosures prior
to the FCPA served no protective role. See Weiss, Governance, Disclosure, and Corporate
Legitimacy, in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, supra note 10, at 58, 76 (no incumbent directors of
corporations that admitted making questionable payments were deposed as consequence
of dissident shareholder campaigns and few of shareholder proposals challenging such
payments received great support). The courts, moreover, have rejected claims attacking
proxy statements for failure to disclose questionable foreign payments. See Lewis v. Valley,
[1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,179 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1979) (non-
disclosure of Singer Co. foreign payments not material to shareholder vote on executive
compensation and stock option plans); Lewis v. Elam, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 96,013, at 91,555 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1977) (proxy solicitation not a link to
accomplishment of improper payments); Limmer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,111, at 92,002 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1977) (con-
nection between exercise of corporate suffrage and acts of waste, improper payments, "too
tenuous to support" federal intervention in state law cause of action).
If a member of the board is involved in management dishonesty or fraud, however, and
is up for reelection, then such conduct would be material to shareholders in deciding how
to vote, and hence is disclosable. See SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,226, at 98,187 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975) (Kalvex proxy statement was
defective for not disclosing involvement in various kickback schemes of officer and director
up for reelection).
102. See note 42 supra. The accounting profession has also declined to require manage-
ment internal control reports on the grounds that such reports could even be misunder-
stood and misleading. See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, supra
note 18, §§ 640.03-.09; Deloitte, Haskins &- Sells, Response to SEC Proposed Statement of
Management on Internal Accounting Control 3-4 (Aug. 14, 1979) (on file with SEC). The
profession still believes an SEC-required management report on internal controls would be
misleading to general readers because they might not realize that such reports could not
add credibility to prior audited financial statements or provide assurance that manage-
ment stewardship objectives will be met in the future. See id. at 6-7.
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if enforced with a view to disclosure materiality. They should not,
however, be interpreted to allow a more direct role for the SEC in
internal corporate affairs. Restructuring and regulating corporate deci-
sionmaking, if desired, 0 3 should be effected not through SEC dis-
closure discretion, but rather through direct legislation following
public debate.104
103. Commentators criticizing the concentration of economic power in corporate form
and the increasing separation of corporate control from ownership have argued that be-
cause owners have become content with a passive role, they have surrendered their right
to have corporate activity regulated in their economic interest to the interests of the com-
munity at large. See, e.g., A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 355-56 (1933). Under this view, the corporation should become a more public,
social institution whose decisionmaking should be monitored in the public interest. See
id. at 356-57; Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate
Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 578 (1972). Other commentators, however, have
questioned the desirability of such a regulatory framework. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LkiW 289-313 (2d ed. 1977) (describing economic efficiency of corporate form
and separation of management and ownership); Manning, Corporate Power and In-
dividual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38
(1960) (calling for concentration on particular undesirable corporate acts rather than on
general "corporate power" and "unpropertied" and "disenfranchised" shareholders); Ruder,
Public Obligations of Private Corporations, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 209, 213-15 (1965) (describ-
ing proposition that the competitive pursuit of profit is desirable for the economy).
104. Direct legislation could take one of any number of suggested forms, including
public directorships, representative boards, federal incorporation, federal minimum stan-
dards, or uniform corporate structure. See R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, supra note
85 (advocating federal incorporation law); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 152-73 (1975)
(discussing modern corporate influence and suggesting general public directors); Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (ad-
vocating minimum federal standards of corporate responsibility). Such legislation would
replace the existing disclosure framework under the Securities Acts, providing managers
with more explicit guides to the proper scope of their activity and the extent of their
liability.
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